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HOLDER v. HALL
114 S.Ct. 2581 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Since its creation in 1912, Bleckley County,
Georgia, has been governed by a single county com-
missioner. The commissioner, who has always been
white, holds all executive and legislative authority.
Bleckley County is twenty per cent black. In 1985,
the state legislature authorized the county to adopt,
if it wished, a multimember commission form con-
sisting of five members elected from single member
districts. This plan was defeated by voters although
they had previously approved of a five-member dis-
trict plan for the county school board. Respondents,
six black registered voters from the county and the
local chapter of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, sued the county
commissioner and the board of elections alleging that
the single commissioner form of county government
violated the Fourteenth' and Fifteenthz Amend-
ments and section two of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (the Act).
3
The district court4 held for the defendants, con-
cluding that the plaintiffs had not shown intent as
required by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments and that they had not proven a violation of
the Voting Rights Act. The district court applied the
test set out in Thornburg v. Gingles5 and held that
the plaintiffs met the compactness prong of the test
but failed to show that their minority group was
politically cohesive or that whites usually voted as a
bloc. The court of appeals6 reversed, concluding that
the respondents had met the second and third prongs
'Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
2 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment states that
"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on the account of race, color, or previous servitude."
U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
3 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act states in part:
"[Njo voting qualifications or prerequisites to vot-
ing, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any state or political subdivision in a man-
of the Gingles test.Because of the statutory ruling,
the court of appeals did not consider the district
court's ruling on the constitutional claim.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court, in a five to
four decision, held that the size of a governing body
cannot be challenged under section two of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.7 The case was remanded to the dis-
trict court to hear black residents' arguments that
the single commissioner government violates their
constitutional rights to equal protection under the
law.a
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
In a plurality opinion, joined in toto only by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and joined in part by Jus-
tice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy stated that to de-
termine whether vote dilution prohibited by sec-
tion two of the Voting Rights Act has occurred, a
benchmark is required to determine the amount of
dilution.9 Hence, a vote dilution suit challenging the
size of a governmental body is problematic because
there "is no principled reason why one size should
be picked over another for comparison." 0 With no
objective standard, it is impossible to evaluate
whether vote dilution has occurred, even when the
Gingles totality of circumstances preconditions are
met."
ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
4 Hall v. Holder, 757 F.Supp. 1560 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
s 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (requiring that "the minority
group ... is sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district, that
the majority group "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it - in the absence of special circumstance ... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate').
6 Holder v. Hall, 955 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992).
7 Holderv. Hall, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2587 (1994).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2585.
10 Id.
I IId.
The respondents argued that, since the size of a
governing body may not, pursuant to section five
12
of the Voting Rights Act, be changed in covered ju-
risdictions without preclearance, size may be an el-
ement of a dilution challenge But Justice Kennedy
and Chief Justice Rehnquist answered that section
two and section five of the Voting Rights Act are
different in scope.'3 Section five addresses changes
in existing voting procedures and bars those that are
retrogressive as measured against an existing prac-
tice.' 4 A voting practice that must be precleared
under section five can not necessarily be challenged
in a section two dilution suit, because in a section
five suit, a benchmark exists by definition.'5
Writing separately, Justice O'Connor disagreed
that section two and section five are different in
scope, but asserted that a suit challenging the size
of a governing body cannot be maintained under
section two because there can never be an objective
alternative benchmark for comparison.' 6 "In a dilu-
tion challenge to the size of a governing authority,
choosing the alternative for comparison - a hypo-
thetical larger (or smaller) governing authority - is
extremely problematic. The wide range of possibili-
ties makes the choice inherently standardless." 7 For
that reason, Justice O'Connor would not allow any
vote dilution suit which challenges the size of a gov-
ernmental body.
Justice Thomas, in a concurring ppinion joined
by Justice Scalia, completely foreclosed the possi-
bility of any kind of vote dilution suit being brought
under section two, because vote dilution is not a
"standard, practice, or procedure" within the terms
of section two.'8
12 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires
preclearance approval by a court or by the Attorney Gen-
eral "[w]henever a [covered] State or political subdivi-
sion... shall enact or seek to administer any voting quali-
fication or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting... different from that
[previously] in force or effect" so as to ensure that it "does
not have the purpose and will have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on the account of race or
color. .. ." 42 U.SC. § 1973c (1982).
13 Holder, 114 S.Ct. at 2586.
14 Id.
1- Id. at 2587.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 2589.
18 Id. at 2587.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 2591.
21 Section 2(b) provides that a violation of subsec-
tion (a) is established if, based on the totality of the cir-
Justice Thomas argued that the language of the
Voting Rights Act has been misinterpreted by the
Court in previous cases. Neither size of a governing
body nor allegedly dilutive election methods are a
'standard, practice, or procedure' within the terms
of the Act, because "those terms reach only state
enactments that limit citizens' access to the ballot."'9
Thus, Justice Thomas argued for a "systematic reas-
sessment of section two jurisprudence."2 0
According to Justice Thomas, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, originally designed to ensure blacks
the right to register and vote, has been converted
into a device for regulating political power among
racial and ethnic groups, and indeed for proportional
representation in contradiction to the plain terms
of the Act.2 ' In Justice Thomas's view, it is not the
business of the courts to choose political theories of
representation. The Act serves only to ensure blacks
the -vote, not to ensure their political power, "in a
majoritarian system, numerical minorities lose elec-
tions." In sum, Justice Thomas concluded that prior
group vote dilution jurisprudence is repugnant to
the Court and is not in fact covered by section two
of the Voting Rights Act."3
The dissent24 argued that it is well settled that
the size of a governing body is a "standard, practice
or procedure" under section two of theVoting Rights
Act and that "by all objective measures, the pro-
posed five-member Blecdey County Commission
[authorized by the state legislature] presents a rea-
sonable, workable benchmark against which to mea-
sure the practice of electing a sole commissionerl
The dissent further asserted that here "identifying
an appropriate baseline against which to measure is'
cumstances, it is shown that the political processes lead-
ing to nomination or election... are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportu-
nity than other member of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office ... is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the popu-
lation. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
" Holder, 114 S.Ct. at 2596.
21 Id. at 2598.
24 Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Jus-
tice Ginsberg filed a separate opinion. Justice Stevens
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blaclanun,
Souter and Ginsburg joined.
s Holde, 114 S.Ct. at 2622.
not difficult. In other cases, it may be harder. But
the need to make difficult judgments does not 'jus-
tify a judicially created limitation on the coverage
of the broadly worded statute, as amended by Con-
gress."
2 6
I. The Statutory Claim
In this section two vote dilution suit challeng-
ing the size of a governing authority, the Court
seemed most concerned that no benchmark exists
by which to measure vote dilution.'"With respect to
challenges to the size of a governing authority, re-
spondents fail to explain where the search for rea-
sonable alternative benchmarks should begin and
end, and they provide no acceptable principles for
deciding future cases ... we therefore conclude that
a plaintiff cannot maintain a section two challenge
to the size of a government body ....27
In some respects the plurality's holding is not
unequivocal. Although they concluded that a plain-
tiff cannot maintain a section two challenge to the
size of a government body because the determina-
tion of a benchmark is "inherently standardless," one
wonders whether the plurality might have found a
violation of section two if respondents in this case
had made a more convincing showing of an accept-
able benchmark. Under this reading, only two jus-
tices in the majority completely foreclosed section
two suits challenging the size of a governmental
body: Justices Thomas and Scalia asserted that the
Court should not attempt to determine benchmarks
in any kind of vote dilution case.
The problem of identifying a benchmark is
unique to section two challenges to size because, as
Justice Kennedy pointed out, in other section two
dilution cases such as challenges to an anti-single-
shot voting rule, for instance, dilution can be evalu-
ated by comparing the system with that rule to the
system without that rule.28 In a challenge to a
multimember at-large system, a court may compare
it to a system of multiple single-member districts.
26 Id. at 2622 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S.Ct.
2354, 2368 (1991))(holding that section two of the Vot-
ing Rights Act applied to the at-large election from a
multimember district of two members of the seven-mem-'
ber Louisiana Supreme Court).
27 Holder, 114 S.Ct. at 2587.
28 Id. at 2585.
19 Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F2d
1547 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied sub nom., Duncan v.
Carrolton, 485 U.S. 936 (1988) (holding that Gingles re-
quired a restructuring of the single commissioner form of
government and remanded the case for the sole purpose
The Holder decision implicity overrules a Eleventh
Circuit case29 in which a single commissioner form
of government was challenged under section two.
In that case neither the district court nor the appel-
late court considered the question of an appropri-
ate benchmark.
By focusing on the absence of a benchmark by
which to measure the amount of dilution, the plu-
rality erects a roadblock for plaintiffs bringing suits
under the Voting Rights Act. In effect, the plurality
adds another prong to the Gingles test for case in
which the size of a governing body is challenged.
The Court agreed with the court of appeals that the
Gingles preconditions have been met. However, the
Court seemed to be saying that, although a stan-
dard, practice or procedure abridges minority vot-
ing rights, without an objective showing of degree,
there is no remedy.
This is disingenuous. The benchmark require-
ment belies the Court's growing anxiety in deciding
cases involving race-based classifications. The un-
derlying rationale for the plurality's opinion is in step
with the holdings of Shaw v. Reno" and Johnson v.
DeGrandy,31 in which the majority disfavors racial
categorizations whether they help or hurt minori-
ties.
To their credit, Justices Thomas and Scalia are
more forthright in their approach in holding that
vote dilution cases should not be heard under sec-
tion two. In contrast to Justices Kennedy, O'Connor
and the Chief Justice, who draw the line against vote
dilution cases where determining benchmarks is too
difficult, Justices Thomas and Scalia asserted that
whenever the Court makes a determination of a
benchmark, it is making a policy judgment and that
in pursuing the ideal measure of voting strength,
the Court has devised remedial mechanisms that
encourage federal courts to segregate voters into ra-
cially designated districts to ensure minority voting
success. 3
2
of allowing the plaintiffs to prove sufficient geographic
compactness and political cohesiveness to establish a vio-
lation of section 2).
3. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding for the first time
that white voters could challenge the constitutionality of
oddly drawn majority black districts).
3, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (1994) (ruling that the Voting
Rights Act does not entitle minority voters to the largest
possible number of minority dominated election districts);
see also Johnson v. DeGrandy, 1 REAL Digest 48 (this
digest).
31 Holder, 114 S.Ct at 2591.
II. The Constitutional Claims
The Court addressed only the statutory claim
of the respondents.33 The question not answered in
this case is what evidence of intent would be neces-
sary to establish a violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.
The showing of intent is not always easy. In the
district court, the only court in this case to examine
the constitutional claim, the absence of any evidence
showing that the single commissioner government
was established to abridge the voting rights of Afri-
can-Americans was conclusive to the finding of no
intent. The district court followed the district court's
analysis in Stalings, which emphasized the. impor-
tance of the plaintiff's historical evidence that Carroll
County had sought to establish a one person com-
mission in order to keep blacks from participating
in local government. The Stallings court found ra-
cially charged statemients about the advantages of a
single commissioner by a government official to be
particularly dispositive of intent.
34
In voting rights cases that have reached the Su-
preme Court, the intent standard has been equally
high. In Mobile v. Bolden,35 Justice Stewart asserted
that in order to claim that an at-large system vio-
lated the Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, the plaintiff would have the
burden of showing that the at-large scheme "repre-
sents purposeful discrimination against the Negro
voter."
36
In the constitutional claims, although the prob-
lem of determining a benchmark that is created by
33 Id. at 2587.
34 Stallings, 829 F.2d at 1552.
35 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
36 Id. at 74.
the statutory results test may be eliminated to a cer-
tain extent, a showing of intent would not necessar-
ily allay the judicial policy-making concerns of the
Court. Even if intent is shown, the amount of dilu-
tion caused by a particular governmental structure
would need to be determined and an appropriate
remedy would have to be identified.
CONCLUSION
While the Holder Court has added further re-
strictions on section two, all, however, may not be
lost - yet. While it is debatable whether a plaintiff
could ever point to an acceptable benchmark, plain-
tiffs who are successful in doing so may prevail in a
dilution challenge to size. This window of opportu-
nity, however, does not offer much hope given the
Court's growing hostility toward the Voting Rights
Act -as evidenced in Johnson and Shaw.
In adding the benchmark requirement to the
Gingles inquiry, the Court transformed the results
test heralded as a victory by civil rights activists into
a hindrance in vote dilution challenges to size. And
while the Holder Court did not evaluate intent, judg-
ing from the outcome of recent constitutional vot-
ing rights cases,37 minority plaintiffs who bring a vote
dilution claim under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments are likely to fare no better.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Carla J. Urquhart
37 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. at 2816 (1993); See
also Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 E2d
1547 (11th Cir. 1987).
